By KOTARO SUZUMURA Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
The JEA (Japanese Economic Association)-Nakahara Prize was initiated in 1995, and is funded by a donation from Mr Nobuyuki Nakahara. The purpose of the prize is to honour young Japanese economists under the age of 45 who have accomplished internationally recognized academic research.
It is my great pleasure to announce that the 1999 JEA-Nakahara Prize has been awarded to Professor Akira Okada. Born in 1954, he took his BA in 1977 and his PhD in 1982, both from the Tokyo Institute of Technology. His current affiliation is with the Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, where he has been Professor of Economics since 1996.
Professor Okada has made several outstanding contributions in the areas of noncooperative game theory and its applications to bargaining problems, oligopolistic competition with incomplete information and the theory of collective actions. Among his major works is the introduction of a new concept called the strictly perfect equilibrium point of an n-person non-cooperative game. Also important is his analysis of n-person strategic bargaining models with coalition formation, where he investigated how cooperation can be attained among self-interested individuals through voluntary bargaining. In addition, he has studied the possibility of an enforcement institution for collective actions in an anarchical state of the prisoners' dilemma. His model is applicable to a wide range of collective actions.
Professor Okada's major works include the following:
“On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points”, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 10 (1981), pp. 67±73.
“Strictly Perfect Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games”, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 13 (1984), pp. 145-154.
“A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem”, in R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models III: Strategic Bargaining, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 7-34.
“The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements”, Public Choice, Vol. 77 (1993), pp. 629-656.
“A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers”, Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 16 (1996), pp. 97-108.
Selection Committee
Kotaro
Suzumura, Hitotsubashi University (Chairman)
Jean-Michel
Grandmont, CREST
Dale Jorgenson, Harvard University
Kunio
Kawamata, Keio University
Kazuo Nishimura, Kyoto
University
Michihiro Ohyama, Keio University (1998
President)
Amartya Sen, Cambridge University.